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Abstract
In this work, we consider stochastic variational inequalities arising from a
certain class of equilibrium problems with uncertainties. Uncertainties in
the models are introduced through data that are known through their prob-
abilistic distributions. We consider several extragradient methods for the
solutions of the variational inequalities and compare their relative efficiency
and effectiveness through thorough numerical comparisons. Several appli-
cations such as traffic equilibrium, environmental games, and oligopolistic
market equilibrium are considered.
Keywords: stochastic linear complementarity problem, stochastic variation-
al inequalities, traffic equilibrium, oligopolistic market equilibrium, environ-
mental games, Cournot oligopology.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, we will introduce linear complementarity problems(LCP).
We will give some application examples, and also briefly discuss determinis-
tic and stochastic variational inequalities related to linear complementarity
problems.
1.1 Linear Complementarity Problem
The linear complementarity problem is to find a vector in a finite-dimensional
real vector space in which the vector needs to satisfy a certain system of
inequalities.
Given a pair (q,M) of a vector q ∈ IRn and a matrix M ∈ IRn×n, the Linear
Complementarity Problem (LCP), is to find a vector p ∈ IRn such that
p ≥ 0 (1.1)
q +Mp ≥ 0 (1.2)
p>(q +Mp) = 0 (1.3)
or to show that no such p exists.
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1.2 Problems equivalent to LCP
In this section, we will introduce several LCP application problems whose
formulations are used to develop computational methods.
1.2.1 Quadratic Programming
Consider the quadratic program (QP)




subject to Ax ≥ b (1.4)
x ≥ 0
where Q ∈ IRn×n is symmetric, c ∈ IRn, A ∈ IRm×n, and b ∈ IRm. Note
that Q = 0 gives a linear program. It is known that if x is a locally optimal
solution of (1.4), then there exists a vector y ∈ IRm such that the pair (x, y)
satisfies the so-called Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
u = c+Qx− A>y ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, x>u = 0 (1.5)
v = −b+ Ax ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, y>v = 0. (1.6)
Furthermore, if Q is positive semi-definite (i.e. the objective function f(x)
is convex), the the conditions (1.5) and (1.6) are sufficient for the vector x
to be globally optimal solution of the quadratic program (1.4).












Notice that M is not symmetric. Also, if Q is positive semi-definite, then so
is M .
A special case of (1.4) is




subject to x ≥ 0. (1.9)
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IfQ is positive semi-definite, them the program (1.9) is equivalent to LCP(c,Q)
(with symmetric Q).
1.2.2 Market Equilibrium
A market equilibrium is the state of an economy in which demands of con-
sumers and the supplies of producers are balanced at the prevailing price
level. Consider a market equilibrium problem where supply side is described
by a linear programming model to capture the details of the production activ-
ities. The market demand function is generated by models with commodity
prices as the primary independent variables. The mathematical problem is to
find vectors p∗ and r∗ such that the constraints stated in (i)- (iii)are satisfied.
(i) supply side
minimize f(x) = c>x
subject to Ax ≥ b (1.10)
Bx ≥ r∗ (1.11)
x ≥ 0
where c is the cost vector for supply activities, x is the vector of production
activity levels. Condition (1.10) represents the technological constraints on
production, and the condition (1.11) is the demand requirement constraints.
(i) demand side
minimize r∗ = Q(p∗) = Dp∗ + d (1.12)
where Q is the market demand function with p∗ and r∗ representing the
vectors of demand prices and quantities respectively.
(iii) equilibrium conditions
p∗ = π∗ (1.13)
where π∗ denotes the vector of shadow prices (i.e. the market supply prices)
corresponding to the constraint (1.11).
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1.2.3 Nonlinear Complementarity and Variational In-
equality Problems
The LCP is a special case of nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP) the
goal of which is to find a vector p such that
p ≥ 0, f(p) ≥ 0, and p>f(p) = 0 (1.14)
where f is a given mapping from IRn into itself. LCP is a particular case of
NCP where f(p) = q + Mp (a linear function). The nonlinear complemen-
tarity problem provides a unified formulation to nonlinear programming and
many equilibrium problems such as traffic equilibrium problem and the n-
person Nash-Cournot equilibrium problem. One of the solution methods for
the nonlinear complementarity problem are linear approximation methods
where you solve a sequence of linear complementarity problems of form
vif irstp ≥ 0, w = f(p(k)) + A(p(k))(p− p(k)) ≥ 0, p>w = 0 (1.15)
where p(k) is the current iterate and A(p(k)) is some suitable approximation
of the Jacobian matrix ∇f(p(k)). For example, when A(p(k)) is the Jacobian
matrix, then we have Newton’s method for NCP.
Another generalization of the nonlinear complementarity problem is varia-
tional inequality problem: Given a nonempty subset K of IRn and a mapping
f from IRn to itself, find a vector x∗ such that
(y − x∗)>f(x∗) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ K.
The problem is denoted by VI(K, f).
1.3 Stochastic Linear Complementarity Prob-
lem
In applications of LCP there is almost always certain types of uncertainties
such as weather, material, load, supply demand are involved. Let (Ω,F ,P)
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be a probability space with Ω ⊆ IRm where probability distribution P is
known. For ω ∈ Ω, we consider random quantities M(ω) ∈ IRn×n and
q(ω) ∈ IRn.
The Stochastic Linear Complementarity Problem (SLCP) is to find a vector
x ∈ IRn such that
M(ω)x+ q(ω) ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, x>(M(ω)x+ q(ω)) = 0, ω ∈ Ω. (1.16)
1.4 Stochastic Variational Inequality
In this section, we introduce the particular form of stochastic variational
inequality that we will consider in the following chapters. Let (Ω,F ,P) be
a probability space. We define a random set
M(ω) := {x ∈ IRk : Ax ≤ D(ω)} (1.17)
for ω ∈ Ω by using a given matrix A ∈ IRm×k and random vector D in IRm.
Consider the following Stochastic Variational Inequality (SVI): For ω ∈ Ω,
find x := x(ω) ∈M(ω) such that
〈S(ω)G(x) +H(x), z − x〉 ≥ 〈R(ω) c+ b, z − x〉
for every z ∈M(ω).
Here, G,H : IRk → IRk are two given maps. Real valued random variables




We will study stochastic variational inequalities in this chapter. Theory of
variational inequalities provides an efficient mathematical apparatus for s-
tudying a wide range of problems arising in diverse fields such as structural
mechanics, elasticity, economics, optimization, financial mathematics, and
others. Variational inequalities have been used extensively for various net-
work equilibrium problems and in particular for transportation science mod-
els (see, for instance, the book [34] and the cited references therein). Many of
the research on the applications of variational inequalities to various aspects
of transportation science and others so far have been in connection with de-
terministic models. However, since the data for the most problems are often
affected by uncertainty or randomness in real-world applications, their vari-
ational inequality formulations must take into account for this stochasticity.
This is a well justified need, and in recent years scientific community have
witnessed an acute increase in research where the authors have incorporated
stochasticity in the models.
We will first talk about the so-called elliptic regularization technique in the
context of stochastic variational inequalities introduced in [23]. The regular-
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ization methods have been studied extensively for deterministic variational
inequalities and the motivation to study regularization stems from the fact
that network problems lead naturally to monotone variational inequalities.
In order to use effective numerical techniques designed for strongly monotone
variational inequalities, the authors in [23] resorted to regularization strate-
gies. Theoretical results that allow a satisfactory treatment of monotone
variational inequalities are provided. The authors performed a comparison of
a rigorous Lp approach they considered with a popular sample-path approach
for stochastic variational inequalities proposed by Agdeppa, Yamashita, and
Fukushima [1] and Chen, Zhang, and Fukushima [6] by using a suite of test
problems.
2.0.1 Lp approach
The methodology adopted there is the Lp-approach pioneered by Gwin-
ner [16] in the context of variational inequalities with linear random op-
erators. He gave new existence theorems and discretization schemes and
also presented an interesting application of the proposed theory to unilateral
boundary value problems. The functional setting introduced in [16] was lat-
er strengthened in [18] to include randomness in the underlying constraints
set (see also [17]). More recently, in [19] and [20], the authors investigated
stochastic variational inequalities with nonlinear monotone maps. Besides p-
resenting a generalization of the existing theory, the nonlinear extension was
motivated by the need to cope with the nonlinearity in many equilibrium
problems arising in operations research such as the random traffic equilib-
rium problems which is studied in detail in this article. In these studies,
the focus was on functional analytic methods to obtain approximations of
the solution (a random vector) together with approximations of statistical
quantities such as the mean and variance of the (random) solution.
In contrast to the aforementioned Lp approach, the so-called sample-path
approach (SPA), commonly studied in connection to stochastic variational
inequalities, aims to associate to the original (stochastic) problem to a de-
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terministic problem which is obtained by sampling/averaging the data of the
original problem. Many techniques have been used for the purpose of aver-
aging/sampling. For instance, a Monte Carlo sampling method is available
in Patriksson [35], Shapiro [40], Shapiro, Dentcheva, and Ruszczyński [41],
and Shapiro and Xu [42], among others. Gürken, Özge, and Robinson [15]
initiated the use of sample-path methods for variational inequalities (see also
[14]). In these works, the authors focused on stochastic variational inequali-
ties involving a Fréchet differentiable maps defined on polyhedral sets in finite
dimensional setting. Since then this methodology has been extensively used
by M. Fukushima and his co-workers (see [5], [1], [6]). In these works, the
authors proposed an expected residual minimization method for stochastic
linear complementarity problems and variational inequalities and gave vari-
ous applications to equilibrium problems. Recently, many researchers applied
the sample-path approach to Stackelberg and Nash games (see De Miguel and
Xu [10], and Ravat and Shanbhag [37] and [38]). We would like to also point
out an interesting work by Dentcheva and Ruszcynsky [11] where the authors
investigated optimization problems with the so-called stochastic dominance
constraints.
2.0.2 Existing Methods
In the following, we briefly discuss some of the existing methodologies avail-
able in the literature. We begin with a discussion of the expected residual
minimization method. The method described in Chen and Fukushima [5] is
in the context of the following variational inequality: find x ∈ S ⊆ Rn such
that
F (x, ω)T (y − x) ≥ 0, ∀ y ∈ S,
where the set S is closed and convex, (Ω,A, P ) is the probability space, and
F : Rn × Ω→ Rn.
In fact, the authors focused on the case when S is the positive orthant. For
this particular case, the above variational inequality reduces to the following
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complementarity problem: Find x ∈ Rn such that
F (x, ω) ≥ 0, x ≥ 0, F (x, ω, x)Tx = 0.
The main issue here is how to construct an averaged problem that can re-
place the stochastic one and how to devise a variant of the approach proposed
in [15] and [14]. We recall that the strategy of [15] consists of solving the
deterministic complementarity problem that results from replacing the map
F (x, ω) with its expectation F∞ = E[F (x, ω)]. In general, this problem is
different from the one that is obtained by replacing the random variable ω
with its expectation. To approximate F∞ in an efficient way, a sequence of
approximate problems can be considered in which F∞ is approximated by
functions Fk(x) by employing discrete distributions and Monte-Carlo meth-
ods. Once the stochastic complementarity has been converted into a deter-
ministic one, the latter can be solved by some suitable method. The authors
in the aforementioned studies used the so-called nonlinear complementary
functions to solve the deterministic complementarity problem. Recall that a
function ϕ : R2 → R is called a nonlinear complementary function if an only
if
ϕ(a, b) = 0 ⇐⇒ a ≥ 0, b ≥ 0, ab = 0.






Φ(x, ω) = (ϕ(F1(x, ω), x1), . . . , ϕ(Fn(x, ω), xn))
T .
This approach can be interpreted as an average least-squares approach. To
compute the expectations, the authors generated observation by using quasi-
Monte-Carlo methods. Moreover, they proved that every accumulation point
of sample approximation problems is a minimizer for (2.1). We remark that
when for every ω, the stochastic problem has the unique solution x(ω), no re-
lation between the accumulation point of the approximation and of E[(x(ω)]
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has been established. This approach is further developed in [6] where the
authors discussed the robustness of their method, gave new error bounds,
and proposed a procedure to generate a class of stochastic complementarity
problem to which their method can be applied. They also gave a concrete
application to stochastic traffic equilibrium problems. In [1], the authors
studied a stochastic affine variational inequality by the same approach and
proposed a convex expected residual model. They also applied their results
to traffic equilibrium problems. The above mentioned papers contain a deep
analysis of the structure of the deterministic problem which emerges from
the stochastic one. In [1, p.2], the authors state that their approach leads
to a reasonable solution of the stochastic variational inequality. Clearly, a
reasonable solution should be close to the exact mean value solution.
A thorough comparison between the Lp approach and the sample-path ap-
proach was done in [23]. The authors introduced randomness into the traffic
equilibrium models first used in [1] and [6] and solved them by applying the
Lp-approach. The Lp approach allows to compute approximations to the ex-
act mean value of the random solution vector, and the authors were also able
to compute the exact mean values. Through the examples, they attempt-
ed to validate the approximation procedure and compare with the expected
residual method.
2.1 Stochastic Variational Inequalities
In this section, we recall some recent results from Jadamba, Khan, and Raciti
[23]. Let (Ω,A, P ) be a probability space. Let G,H : Rk → Rk be two given
maps, let b, c ∈ Rk be fixed vectors, and let R and S be two real-valued
random variables defined on Ω. Let λ be a random vector in Rk, let D be
random vector in Rm, and let A ∈ Rm×k be a given matrix. For ω ∈ Ω, we
define a random set
M(ω) := {x ∈ Rk : Ax ≤ D(ω)}.
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Consider the following stochastic variational inequality: For almost all ω ∈ Ω,
find x̂ := x̂(ω) ∈M(ω) such that
〈S(ω)G(x̂) +H(x̂), z − x̂〉 ≥ 〈R(ω) c+ b, z − x̂〉 (2.2)
for every z ∈M(ω). Variational inequality (2.2) holds pointwise on Ω, except
a fixed null set depending on the solution x̂.
Now set
F (ω, x) := S(ω)G(x) +H(x).
The assumption here is that S,G and H are such that the map F : Ω×Rk 7→
Rk is a Carathéodory function. That is, for each fixed x ∈ Rk, the function
F (·, x) is measurable with respect to A whereas for each ω ∈ Ω the function
F (ω, ·) is continuous. We also assume that F (ω, ·) is monotone for every
ω ∈ Ω.
Let Σ : Ω ↪→ Rk be the set-valued map that associates to each ω ∈ Ω,
the set of all solutions Σ(ω) of (2.2). Gwinner and Raciti [18] proved the
measurability of the set-valued map Σ for variational inequalities defined via
bilinear forms. However, the proof given there can readily be extended to
the general case of nonlinear operators. If (2.2) is uniquely solvable, then
suitable conditions ensure that the solution belongs to an Lp space for some
p ≥ 2. This observation allows us to compute statistical quantities such as
the mean values and the variances of the solution.
2.1.1 Integral Formulation
Now, we proceed to derive the integral formulation of the variational inequal-
ity (2.2). For a fixed p ≥ 2, we define the reflexive Banach space Lp(Ω, P,Rk)





‖V (ω)‖pdP (ω) <∞.
For the subsequent development, the following growth condition is needed:
‖F (ω, z)‖ ≤ α(ω) + β(ω)‖z‖p−1, ∀z ∈ Rk, for some p ≥ 2, (2.3)
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where α ∈ Lp(Ω, P ) and β ∈ L∞(Ω, P ).
Due to the above growth condition, the Nemitsky operator F̂ associated to
F , acts from Lp(Ω, P,Rk) to Lq(Ω, P,Rk), where p−1 +q−1 = 1. Furthermore,
we have
F̂ (V )(ω) := F (ω, V (ω)), ω ∈ Ω.
Assuming D ∈ Lpm(Ω) := Lp(Ω, P,Rm), we introduce the following nonempty,
closed and convex subset of Lpk(Ω)
MP := {V ∈ Lpk(Ω) : AV (ω) ≤ D(ω), P − a.s.},
which is the Lp analogue of M(ω) defined above.
Let S(ω) ∈ L∞, 0 < s < S(ω) < s, and R(ω) ∈ Lq. Equipped with these
notations, we consider the following Lp formulation of (2.2). Find Û ∈ MP
such that for every V ∈MP , we have∫
Ω
〈S(ω)G(Û(ω)) +H(Û(ω)), V (ω)− Û(ω)〉 dP (ω) ≥∫
Ω
〈b+R(ω) c, V (ω)− Û(ω)〉dP (ω). (2.4)
If problems (2.2) and (2.4) are uniquely solvable then they are equivalent
provided that the solution of (2.2) defines an Lp function. The relation
between the two formulations in the general case has been analyzed in [20,
Proposition 1].
To get rid of the abstract sample space Ω, we consider the joint distribution
P of the random vector (R, S,D) and work with the special probability space
(Rd,B(Rd),P), where the dimension d := 2 + m. For simplicity, we assume




y = (r, s, t).
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For each y ∈ Rd, we define the set
M(y) := {x ∈ Rk : Ax ≤ t}.
The pointwise formulation of the variational inequality reads: Find x̂ such
that x̂(y) ∈M(y), P - a.s., and the following inequality holds for P - almost
every y ∈ Rd and for every x ∈M(y), we have
〈sG(x̂(y)) +H(x̂(y)), x− x̂(y)〉 ≥ 〈rc+ b, x− x̂(y)〉 . (2.5)
In order to obtain the integral formulation of (2.5), consider the space Lp(Rd,P,Rk)
and introduce the closed and convex set
MP := {v ∈ Lp(Rd,P,Rk) : Av(r, s, t) ≤ t, P− a.s.}.
With this terminology, we consider the variational inequality of finding û ∈












〈b+ r c, v(y)− û(y)〉 dP(y). (2.6)
The equivalence of (2.5) and (2.6) can easily be proven.
It is also observed that this approach and analysis extends readily to more








We recall the following general result useful to ensure solvability of an infinite
dimensional variational inequality like (2.4), (see [29] for a recent survey on
existence results for variational inequalities).
Theorem 2.1.1 Let E be a reflexive Banach space and let K be a nonempty,
closed, and convex subset of E Let A : K −→ E∗ be monotone and continuous
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on finite dimensional subspaces of K. Consider the variational inequality
problem of finding u ∈ K such that
〈Au, v − u〉E,E∗ ≥ 0, for every v ∈ K.
Then a necessary and sufficient condition for the above problem to be solvable
is the existence of δ > 0 such that at least a solution of the variational
inequality:
uδ ∈ Kδ, 〈Auδ, v − uδ〉E,E∗ ≥ 0,∀v ∈ Kδ
satisfies ‖uδ‖ < δ, where
Kδ = {v ∈ K : ‖v‖ ≤ δ}.
2.2 Approximation by Discretization of Dis-
tributions
This section contains an introduction to an approximate solution of stochastic
variational inequalities by discretization of distributions. The approach was
first introduced by Gwinner [16]. Assume, without any loss of generality,
that R ∈ Lq(Ω, P ) and D ∈ Lpm(Ω, P ) are nonnegative (otherwise we can
use the standard decomposition in the positive part and the negative part).
Moreover, we assume that the support (the set of possible outcomes) of
S ∈ L∞(Ω, P ) is the interval [s, s) ⊂ (0,∞). Furthermore, we assume that
the probability measures PR, PS, and PD are continuous with respect to the
Lebesgue measure, so that according to the theorem of Radon-Nikodym, they
have the probability densities ϕR, ϕS, and ϕDi , i = 1, . . . ,m, respectively.
Therefore, for i = 1, . . . ,m, we have
P = PR ⊗ PS ⊗ PD,
dPR(r) = ϕR(r) dr,
dPS(s) = ϕS(s) ds
dPDi(ti) = ϕDi(ti) dti.
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Notice that v ∈ Lp(Rd,P,Rk) means that (r, s, t) 7→ ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t)v(r, s, t)






Therefore, we can define the probabilistic integral variational inequality:












〈b+ r c, v − û〉ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t) dy .
For numerical approximation of the solution û, we begin with a discretization
of the space X := Lp(Rd,P,Rk). For this, we introduce a sequence {πn}n of
partitions of the support
Υ := [0,∞)× [s, s)× Rm+
of the probability measure P induced by the random elements R, S, and D.


























0 = r0n < r
1
n < . . . r
NRn
n = n
s = s0n < s
1
n < . . . s
NSn
n = s
0 = t0n,i < t
1




n,i = n (i = 1, . . . ,m)
|πRn | := max{rjn − rj−1n : j = 1, . . . , NRn } → 0 (n→∞)
|πSn | := max{skn − sk−1n : k = 1, . . . , NSn } → 0 (n→∞)




n,i : hi = 1, . . . , N
Di
n } → 0 (i = 1, . . . ,m; n→∞) .
17 2.2. Approximation by Discretization of Distributions
These partitions give rise to the exhausting sequence {Υn} of subsets of Υ,





n)× [sk−1n , skn)× Inh ,








For each n ∈ N, we consider the space of the Rl-valued step functions (l ∈ N)
on Υn, extended by 0 outside of Υn:







vnjkh1Injkh(r, s, t) , v
n
jkh ∈ Rl}
where 1I denotes the {0, 1}-valued characteristic function of a subset I.
To approximate an arbitrary function w ∈ Lp(Rd,P,R), we employ the mean
















w(y) dP(y) if P(Injkh) > 0 ;
0 otherwise.
Analogously, for a Lp vector function v = (v1, . . . , vl), we define
µn0v := (µ
n
0v1, . . . , µ
n
0vl).
From [16, Lemma 2.5], and the remarks therein, we obtain the following
result.
Lemma 2.2.1 For any fixed l ∈ N, the linear operator µn0 : Lp(Rd,P,Rl)→
Lp(Rd,P,Rl) is bounded with ‖µn0‖ = 1 and for n→∞, µn0 converges point-
wise in Lp(Rd,P,Rl) to the identity.
18 2.2. Approximation by Discretization of Distributions
To construct approximations for
MP = {v ∈ Lp(Rd,P,Rk) : Av(r, s, t) ≤ t , P− a.s.},
we introduce the orthogonal projector q : (r, s, t) ∈ Rd 7→ t ∈ Rm and define







qnjkh 1Injkh ∈ X
m
n .
This leads to the following sequence of convex and closed sets of the polyhe-
dral type:
MnP := {v ∈ Xkn : Avnjkh ≤ qnjkh , ∀j, k, h}.
It is known (see [19]) that the sequence {MnP } approximate the set MP in the
sense of Mosco (see [31]). That is, we have
weak-limsupn→∞M
n
P ⊂MP ⊂ strong-liminfn→∞MnP . (2.8)









sk−1n 1[sk−1n ,skn) ∈ Xn.
Notice that
σn(r, s, t) → σ(r, s, t) = s, in L∞(Rd,P)
ρn(r, s, t) → ρ(r, s, t) = r, in Lp(Rd,P),
where the second convergence is a consequence of the Chebyshev inequality.
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Combining the above ingredients, for n ∈ N, we consider the following dis-
cretized variational inequality: Find ûn := ûn(y) ∈ MnP such that for every












〈b+ ρn(y) c, vn − ûn〉 dP(y) . (2.9)
It turns out that (2.9) can be split in a finite number of finite dimensional
variational inequalities: For every n ∈ N, and for every j, k, h, find ûnjkh ∈
Mnjkh such that
〈F̃ nk (ûnjkh), vnjkh − ûnjkh〉 ≥ 〈c̃nj , vnjkh − ûnjkh〉, for every vnjkh ∈Mnjkh, (2.10)
where
Mnjkh := {vnjkh ∈ Rk : Avnjkh ≤ qnjkh} ,
F̃ nk := s
k−1
n G+H











ûnjkh 1Injkh ∈ X
k
n.
We recall the following convergence result from [19].
Theorem 2.2.2 Assume that F (ω, ·) is strongly monotone, uniformly with
respect to ω ∈ Ω, that is
〈F (ω, x)− F (ω, y), x− y〉 ≥ α‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y, a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
where α > 0 and that the growth condition (2.3) holds. Then the sequence
(ûn), where ûn is the unique solution of (2.9), converges strongly in L
p(Rd,P,Rk)
to the unique solution û of (2.6).
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2.3 Regularization
In this section, we detail a regularization approach for stochastic variational
inequalities introduced in [23]. Recall that the probabilistic integral formu-












〈b+ r c, v − û〉ϕR(r)ϕS(s)ϕD(t) dy . (2.11)
Furthermore, the discretized analogue of the above variational inequality













〈b+ ρn(y) c, vn − ûn〉 dP(y) . (2.12)
The above discrete variational inequality will be regularized and it is shown
that its continuous analogue is recovered by the limiting process. First,
a sequence {εn} of regularization parameters is chosen. Also, choose the
regularization map to be the duality map J : Lp(Rd,P,Rk)→ Lq(Rd,P,Rk).
Assume that εn > 0 for every n ∈ N and that εn ↓ 0 as n→∞.
Consider the following regularized stochastic variational inequality: For n ∈












〈b+ ρn(y) c, vn − wn〉 dP(y). (2.13)
The solution wn will be referred to as the regularized solution. The following
theorem highlights some of the features of the regularized solutions:
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Theorem 2.3.1 For every n ∈ N, the regularized stochastic variational in-
equality (2.13) has the unique solution wn. Any weak limit of the sequence
{wn} of the regularized solutions is a solution of (2.11). Furthermore, the
sequence of the regularized solutions {wn} is bounded provided that the fol-
lowing coercivity condition holds: There exists a bounded sequence {δn} with






〈σn(y)G(un) +H(un), un(y)− δn〉 dP(y)
‖un‖
→ ∞ as ‖un‖ → ∞.
(2.14)
For the sake of completion, we recall the proof presented in [23].
Proof. Notice that the map σn(y)G(wn) + H(wn) + εnJ(wn) is strongly
monotone and consequently the regularized problem in uniquely solvable.
We begin by the assumption that the sequence of the regularized solutions
{wn} is bounded. By employing the reflexivity of the space, we can extract
a weakly convergent subsequence. Using the same notation for the subse-
quences as well, let {wn} be the subsequence that converges weakly to some
ū. We claim that ū solves the original problem. In view of the Mosco conver-
gence, the weak convergence ensures that ū ∈MP (see (2.8)). Let z ∈MP be
arbitrary. By employing the Mosco convergence once again, we ensure that
there exists a sequence {zn} such that zn ∈MnP and zn → z. By substituting












〈b+ ρn(y) c, zn − wn〉 dP(y) .












〈b+ ρn(y) c, zn − wn〉 dP(y) .
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Since σn → σ in L∞(Rd,P), we obtain that σn → σ in Lp(Rd,P). Further-
more, since zn → z in Lp(Rd,P,Rk), by passing to limit and using εn → 0,












〈b+ ρ(y) c, z − ū(y)〉 dP(y).












〈b+ ρ(y) c, z − ū(y)〉 dP(y).
Since z ∈ MP is any arbitrary element, we obtain that ū(y) solves the vari-
ational inequality. It remains to show that the sequence of regularized solu-
tions {wn} remains bounded.
We now assume that the coercivity condition (2.14) holds. By substituting












〈b+ ρn(y) c, δn − wn〉 dP(y). (2.15)














〈εnJ(wn)− b− ρn(y) c, δn − wn〉 dP(y)
≤ εn‖wn‖‖δn‖+ ‖b+ ρn(y) c‖‖wn − δn‖























By passing to the limit ‖wn‖ → ∞, we obtain a contradiction to (2.14).





In this chapter, we describe several variants of extragradient methods for
solving the stochastic variational inequality problem
(y − x∗)>f(x∗) ≥ 0, for all y ∈ K. (3.1)
Among many methods for the problem, the simplest one is a projection
method which iteratively updates the solution as
xk+1 = PK(x
k − αf(xk))x
where α is a steplength and PK is the orthogonal projection map onto K.
Projection PK(x






x>x− (xk − αf(xk))>x.
Observe that x∗ is the solution of (3.1) if and only if x∗ = PK(x
∗−αf(x∗)). It
is known that convergence of the method depends on the contractive proper-
ties of the operator x→ x−αf(x). Strong monotonicity, Lipschitz continuity
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of f , and suitable choice of α depending on the monotonicity and Lipschitz
constants guarantee convergence of the method.
3.1 Extragradient Methods
Extragradient methods which require double projections were proposed to
relax the strong hypotheses of the projection method. Korpelevich [26] in-
troduced the extragradient method in the context of saddle point problem
studied through a variational inequality formulation. The methods require





Convergence can be proven under the conditions that the solution set is
nonempty, f is monotone and Lipschitz (with constant L) and α ∈ (0, 1/L).
In the context of variational inequalities, these methods do not require the
strong monotonicity of the map f . Extragradient methods are quite attrac-
tive for variational inequalities where strong monotonicity is attained through
regularization, and these methods demand relaxed conditions on the regular-
ization parameters. In cases of some application problems that we consider
in this work, computing the projection is quite inexpensive due to simple
constraints as these constraints do not add much additional computational
cost.
Clearly, when the constant L is unknown, we may have difficulties choosing an
appropriate steplength α. If α is too small, then the algorithm will converge
slowly and if α is too big, then it may not converge at all.
3.2 Khobotov Extragradient Method
We will now consider extragradient methods where the steplength α is chosen
adaptively. The adaptive steplength was first introduced in [25] to remove
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the constraint that f must be Lipschitz continuous. The adaptive algorithm





Better (speedier) convergence is usually achieved when α gets smaller be-
tween iterations, however, it is clear that we need to also control how the
sequence of {αk} shrinks.





where β ∈ (0, 1). Results from [47] and [25] show that the choice of β as 0.8
or 0.9 performs best, an observation that is also supported by the results we
obtained.
The Khobotov extragradient method has the following general form:
Algorithm: Khobotov Extragradient
Choose α0, x
0, and β ∈ (0, 1)
While ‖xk+1 − xk‖ > TOL
Step 1: Compute f(xk)
Step 2: Compute x̄k = PK(x
k − αkf(xk))
Step 3: Compute f(x̄k)
If f(x̄k) = 0, Stop
Step 4: If αk > β
‖xk−x̄k‖
‖f(xk)−f(x̄k)‖
then reduce αk by a certain rule and go to Step 5
Step 5: Compute xk+1 = PK(x
k − αkf(x̄k))
End.
3.2.1 Marcotte Choices for Steplength
Marcotte developed a new rule for reducing αk along with closely related
variants [28, 47]. The first Marcotte rule is based on the sequence ak =
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1
2











Marcotte reduction rule still has the risk of choosing an initial α small enough
so that αk is never reduced, resulting in slow convergence. Ideally, αk should
then have the ability to increase if αk−1 is smaller than some optimal value.
This leads to a modified version of Marcotte’s rule where an initial α is
selected using the rule







where γ ∈ (0, 1).









where ξ ∈ (0, 1), and α̂ is some lower limit for αk (generally taken as no less
than 10−4).
3.3 Scaled Extragradient Method
We now consider a projection-contraction type extragradient method where
the second projection is a more general operator. It was presented by Solodov
and Tseng [45] and involves a symmetric positive definite scaling matrix M
to accelerate convergence. The main steps read:
x̄k = PK(x
k − αkf(xk))
xk+1 = xk − γM−1(Tα(xk)− Tα(PK(x̄k))
where γ ∈ R+ and Tα = (I − αf). Here, I is the identity matrix, and α is
chosen such that Tα is strongly monotone.
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Additional discussion of the scaling matrix is given in [47], however, in both
[47] and [45], test problems take M equal to the identity matrix. In our nu-
merical experiments, we consider the scaling matrix as the identity matrix.
Algorithm: Solodov-Tseng
Choose x0, α−1, θ ∈ (0, 2), ρ ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1),M ∈ Rm×m
Initialize: x̄0 = 0, k = 0, rx = ones(m, 1)
While ‖rx‖ > TOL
Step 1: if ‖rx‖ < TOL then Stop
else α = αk−1, f lag = 0
Step 2: if f(xk) = 0 then Stop
Step 3: While α(xk − x̄k)T (f(xk)− f(x̄k)) > (1− ρ)‖xk − x̄k‖2 or flag = 0
If flag 6= 0 Then α = αk−1β endif
update x̄k = PK(x
k − αf(xk)), compute f(x̄k)
flag = flag + 1
endwhile
Step 4: update αk = α
Step 5: compute γ = θρ‖xk − x̄k‖2/‖M1/2(xk − x̄k − αkf(xk) + αkf(x̄k))‖2
Step 6: compute xk+1 = xk − γM−1(xk − x̄k − αkf(xk) + αkf(x̄k))
Step 7: rx = xk+1 − Ak, k = k + 1 go to Step 3
End






where αk and ηk are chosen using different rules.
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3.4 Solodov-Svaiter Method
This algorithm was proposed by Solodov and Svaiter in [44]. The idea is
to compute the point PK(x
k − µkf(xk)) and then search the line segment
between xk and PK(x
k − µkf(xk)) for a poitn zk such that the hyperplane
{x ∈ IRn|〈f(zk), x− zk〉 = 0}
strictly separates xk from the solution of the VI x∗. We will use a slightly
modified version of this method (see Section 3.7 for the algorithm).
3.5 Goldstein-Type Methods
The classical Goldstein projection method presented in [27] is of the form:
xk+1 = PK(x
k − βkf(xk))
The He-Goldstein method, an extragradient method that requires Lipschitz
continuity and strong monotonicity of f is of the form:
x̄k = PK(f(x
k)− βkxk)
xk+1 = xk − 1
βk
{f(xk)− x̄k}.




{f(xk)− PK [f(xk)− βkxk]}
xk+1 = xk − r(xk, βk).
A more general version of the above algorithm presented in [27], and it allows
to control the second projection (i.e. choosing ηk).
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Algorithm: Improved He-Goldstein
Initialize: choose βU > βL >
1
(4τ)





{f(xk)− PK [f(xk)− βkxk]}
If ‖r(xk, βk)‖ ≤ ε then Stop
Step 2: xk+1 = xk − γαkr(xk, βk) where αk := 1− 14βkτ







Then βk+1 = max{βL, 12βk}
Else if ωk >
3
2
Then βk+1 = min{βU , 65βk}
Step 4: k = k + 1, go to Step 1
3.6 Two-step Extragradient Method
Zykina and Melenchuk in [48] consider a three step projection method which
they called a two-step extragradient method and investigated its various as-
pects in [49]. Numerical experiments with mixed variational problem for
bilinear function given in [48] shows that the convergent of this method is
faster compared to the standard extragradient method. The adaptive algo-







3.7 Hyperplane Extragradient Method
In this method , ηk is chosen using the following rule from [47]:
ηk =
〈f(x̄k), xk − x̄k〉
‖f(x̄k)‖2
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The idea here is that the hyperplane of all solutions x such that
〈f(x̄k), x̄k − x〉 = 0,
separates all the solutions onto one side of the hyperplane. Looking at the
variational inequality, we know which side the solutions fall onto:
〈f(x), x̄k − x〉 ≥ 0.
Consequently, if f is monotone, then we also have
〈f(x̄k), x̄k − x〉 ≥ 0.
Thus if
〈f(x̄k), x̄k − xk〉 < 0,
then we know that we have to look for the solution on the other side of the
hyperplane.
This method, presented by Iusem, requires three constants, ε ∈ (0, 1) and
α̃ ≥ α̂ > 0 such that the sequence αk is computed such that
〈f(x̄k), x̄k − xk〉 ≤ 0,
when αk ∈ [α̂, α̃].
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Algorithm: Hyperplane (Iusem)
Choose: x0, ε, α̂, α̃
Initialize: k = 0, rx = ones(m, 1)
While ‖rx‖ > TOL
Step 1: Choose α̃k using a finite bracketing procedure
Step 2: Compute Kk = PK(x
k − α̃kf(xk)) and f(Kk)
Step 3: If f(Kk) = 0 then Stop
Step 4: If ‖f(x̃k)− f(xk)‖ ≤ ‖K
k−xk‖2
2α̃2k‖f(xk)‖
Then x̄k = Kk




≤ ‖f(PK(xk − αkf(xk)))− f(xk)‖ ≤ ‖K
k−xk‖2
2α̃2k‖f(xk)‖
Step 5: Compute x̄k = PK(x
k − αkf(xk))
Step 6: If f(x̄k) = 0 then Stop
Step 7: Compute ηk
Step 8: Compute xk+1 = PK(x
k − ηkf(x̄k))
Step 9: rx = xk+1 − fk, k = k + 1; go to Step 3;
End
Chapter 4
Applications and Test Problems
In this chapter, we consider several applications of stochastic variational in-
equalities. We describe models of traffic equilibrium, market equilibrium, and
environmental games. In each case we choose a test problem. The problems
are discretized, and the regularization is incorporated whenever necessary.
We compare the accuracy and efficiency of the extragradient methods de-
scribed in Chapter 3 for all test problems.
4.1 Stochastic Traffic Equilibrium Problem
In this section, we apply the general theory of stochastic variational inequal-
ities to network equilibrium problems. For the considered problem, we first
present the exact solution. This procedure leads to an approximate solu-
tion that is very close to the exact one. The test problem chosen for the
comparison of extragradient methods is taken from Chen et al. [6].
A common characteristic of many network problems is that they admit t-
wo different formulations based either on link variables or on path variables.
These two formulations are related to each other through a linear transfor-
mation. In general, in the path variables approach, the strong monotonicity
assumption is not reasonable. In order to overcome this problem, in [4] a
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Mosco convergence result for the transformed sequence of sets was present-
ed. This allows to work in the space of variables where strong monotonicity
framework is natural. We circumvent the last of strong monotonicity by
means of regularization in this work.
4.1.1 Introduction to Traffic Equilibrium Problem
A traffic network consists of a triple (N,A,W ) where N = {N1, . . . , Np} with
p ∈ N, is the set of nodes, A = (A1, . . . , An), n ∈ N, represents the set of the
directed arcs connecting pairs of nodes and W = {W1, . . . ,Wm} ⊂ N ×N,
m ∈ N is the set of the origin– destination (O,D) pairs. The flow on the arc
Ai is denoted by fi, f = (f1, . . . , fn). For simplicity, we consider arcs with
infinite capacity. A set of consecutive arcs is called a path and assume that
each (Oj, Dj) pair Wj is connected by rj, rj ∈ N, paths whose set is denoted
by Pj, j = 1, . . . ,m. All the paths in the network are grouped in a vector
(R1, . . . , Rk), k ∈ N. The arc structure of the paths is described by using the






, whose entries take the value
δir =
1 if Ai ∈ Rr0 if Ai /∈ Rr. (4.1)
To each path Rr, there corresponds a flow Fr. The path flows are grouped
in a vector (F1, . . . , Fk) which is called the path (network) flow. The flow fi
on the arc Ai is equal to the sum of the flows on the paths which contain
Ai, so that f = ∆F. Let us now introduce the unit cost of going through
Ai as a real function ti(f) ≥ 0 of the flows on the network, so that t(f) =
(t1(f), . . . , tn(f)) denotes the arc cost vector on the network. The meaning
of the cost is usually that of travel time. Analogously, one can define a cost
on the paths as C(F ) = (C1(F ), . . . , Ck(F )). Usually Cr(F ) is just the sum
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or in compact form,
C(F ) = ∆T t(∆F ) . (4.2)
For each pair Wj there is a given traffic demand Dj ≥ 0, so that (D1, . . . , Dm)
is the demand vector. Feasible flows are nonnegative flows which satisfy the
demands, that is, which belong to the set
K =
{
F ∈ Rk : Fr ≥ 0 for any r = 1, . . . , k and ΦF = D
}
,
where Φ is the pair–path incidence matrix whose elements, say ϕjr, j =
1, . . . ,m, r = 1, . . . , k, are
ϕjr =
1 if the path Rr connects the pair Wj0 elsewhere.
A path flow H is called an equilibrium flow or Wardrop Equilibrium, if and
only if H ∈ K and for any Wj ∈ W and any Rq, Rs ∈ Pj there holds
Cq(H) < Cs(H) =⇒ Hs = 0. (4.3)
This statement is equivalent (see [9] and [43]) to finding H ∈ K such that
〈C(H), F −H〉 ≥ 0, ∀F ∈ K. (4.4)
Roughly speaking, the meaning of Wardrop Equilibrium is that the road
users choose minimum cost paths. Let us note that condition (4.3) implies
that all the used paths of a given O-D pair have the same cost.
Although the Wardrop equilibrium principle is expressed in the path vari-
ables, it is clear that the “physical” (and measured) quantities are expressed
in the link variables. Moreover, the strong monotonicity hypothesis on c(f)
is quite common, but as noticed, for instance, in [2] this does not imply the
strong monotonicity of C(F ) in (4.2), unless the matrix ∆T∆ is nonsingu-
lar. Although one can give a procedure for buildings networks preserving
the strong monotonicity property (see for instance [36]), the condition fails
for a generic network, even for a very simple one as we shall illustrate in
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the sequel. Thus, it is useful to consider the following variational inequality
problem:
h ∈ ∆K and 〈t(h), f − h〉 ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ ∆K. (4.5)
If t is strongly monotone, one can prove that for each solution H of (4.4),
C(H) is constant. In other words, all possibly nonunique solutions of (4.4)
share the same cost. From an algorithmic point of view it is worth noting
that one advantage in working in the path variables is the simplicity of the
corresponding convex set but the price to be paid is that the number of paths
grows exponentially with the size of the network.
The random version of (4.4) and (4.5) reads: Find H(ω) ∈ K(ω) such that
〈C(ω,H(ω)), F (ω)−H(ω)〉 ≥ 0, ∀F (ω) ∈ K(ω), (4.6)
where, for any ω ∈ Ω,
K(ω) =
{
F (ω) ∈ Rk : Fr ≥ 0 for any r = 1, . . . , k and ΦF = D(ω)
}
,
Moreover, the random variational inequality in the link-flow variables reads:
Find h(ω) ∈ ∆K(ω) such that
〈t(ω, h(ω)), f(ω)− h(ω)〉 ≥ 0, ∀f(ω) ∈ ∆K(ω). (4.7)
Furthermore, (4.6) is equivalent to the random Wardrop principle: for any
ω ∈ Ω for any H(ω) ∈ K(ω), and for any Wj ∈ W, Rq, Rs ∈ Pj, we have
Cq(ω,H(ω)) < Cs(ω,H(ω)) =⇒ Hs(ω) = 0.
In order to use our approximation scheme, we require the assumption that the
deterministic and random variables are separated. However this assumption
is very natural in many applications where the random perturbation is treat-
ed as a modulation of a deterministic process. Under the above mentioned
assumptions, (4.6) assumes the particular form:
S(ω)〈A(H(ω)), F −H(ω)〉 ≥ R(ω)〈b, F −H(ω)〉, ∀F ∈ K(ω) (4.8)
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In equation (4.8), both the left hand side and the right hand side be replaced
with any (finite) linear combination of monotone and separable terms with
each term satisfying the hypothesis of the previous sections:∑
i
Si(ω)〈ATi (H(ω)), F −H(ω)〉 ≥
∑
j
Rj(ω)〈bj, F −H(ω), ∀F ∈ K(ω)
(4.9)
Therefore, in (4.8) R(ω), S(ω) can be replaced by a random vector and a
random matrix, respectively. As a consequence, in the traffic network, we
could consider the case where the random perturbation has a different weight
for each path.
4.1.2 Numerical Results
In this test problem, we consider the so-called Dafermos’ network consisting







Figure 4.1: Dafermos’ network
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The travel cost function in this case is given by t = Af + b where
A =

10 0 0 5 0
0 15 0 0 5
0 0 20 0 0
2 0 0 20 0
0 1 0 0 25








Here the traffic demand vector is (210, 120) which means
f1 + f2 + f3 = 210
f4 + f5 = 120.
The above deterministic problem has a unique solution f = (120, 90, 0, 70, 50)T .
We consider the stochastic version of this problem considered in [6]. For this,
we introduce two random variables ω1 and ω2 given by
ω1 ∼ 80 ≤ N(210, 1200) ≤ 340
ω2 ∼ U(60, 180).
This is, ω1 and ω2 follow truncated normal and uniform distributions, re-
spectively. Travel demands are given by
f1 + f2 + f3 = ω1
f4 + f5 = ω2.
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Define a new cost function A(ω)f + b with A(ω) = A+ Ã(ω) where
Ã(ω) =

3c1(ω) 0 0 0.5c1(ω)
0 4c1(ω) 0 0 c1(ω)
0 0 0.5c2(ω) 0 0
0.2c1(ω) 0 0 c1(ω) 0
0 0.1c1(ω) 0 0 c1(ω)
 .
We discretize the domain [80, 340]× [60, 180] using N1 subintervals for ω1, N2
for ω2. For each pair (ω1,i, ω2,j) a deterministic variational inequality is solved
by using extragradient methods we consider. We evaluate the mean value
of route flow using probability distribution functions of random variables ω1
and ω2. Table 4.3 shows the mean values of the route flows for four of the
methods. As we see that all methods result very close results, and with
Methods h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
Marcotte 109.5881 82.38575 0.2099183 64.41517 45.78488
Marcotte1 109.5881 82.38577 0.20992 64.41524 45.78481
Marcotte2 109.5881 82.38575 0.2099193 64.41528 45.78477
Solodov-Tseng 109.5926 82.38117 0.210024 64.41455 45.78551
Table 4.1: Route flow solutions for N1 = 30, N2 = 30
Methods V ar(h1) V ar(h2) V ar(h3) V ar(h4) V ar(h5)
Marcotte 1250.983 642.5301 1.7209138 636.23205 369.58061
Marcotte1 1250.9848 642.52891 1.7209352 636.22985 369.58247
Marcotte2 1250.9852 642.52868 1.7209265 636.22847 369.58361
Solodov-Tseng 1250.994 642.5123 1.7218559 636.22748 369.58339
Table 4.2: Variances for route flow for N1 = 30, N2 = 30
more discretization points (larger N1 and N2) the solutions get closer to the
exact solution of the problem (119.835, 89.869, 0.212, 69.992.50.008) given by
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Methods h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
Marcotte 113.6137 85.32718 0.2459893 66.62013 47.45188
Marcotte 1 113.6137 85.3272 0.2459913 66.62019 47.45182
Marcotte 2 113.6137 85.32718 0.2459903 66.62024 47.45177
Solodov-Tseng 113.6181 85.3226 0.2461074 66.6195 47.45253
Table 4.3: Route flow solutions for N1 = 50, N2 = 50
Methods V ar(h1) V ar(h2) V ar(h3) V ar(h4) V ar(h5)
Marcotte 949.2067 470.1265 2.041574 537.9744 321.7377
Marcotte1 949.2089 470.1251 2.041597 537.9718 321.7398
Marcotte2 949.2093 470.1249 2.041588 537.9702 321.7411
Solodov-Tseng 949.1832 470.1341 2.042672 537.9719 321.7389
Table 4.4: Variances for route flow for N1 = 50, N2 = 50
Methods h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
Marcotte 116.694 87.57599 0.2768794 68.29677 48.72123
Marcotte 1 116.694 87.576 0.2768815 68.29684 48.72116
Marcotte 2 116.694 87.57599 0.2768803 68.29688 48.72112
Solodov-Tseng 116.6984 87.57137 0.2770134 68.29614 48.72188
Table 4.5: Route flow solutions for N1 = 100, N2 = 100
Jadamba et al. in [23] (see Table 4.5). Table 4.6 shows variances for route
flows. Comparing the CPU times, we find that for this particular example
Solodov-Tseng method performs fastest given the same stopping criteria.
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Methods V ar(h1) V ar(h2) V ar(h3) V ar(h4) V ar(h5)
Marcotte 700.225 328.4678 2.320375 457.0569 281.8727
Marcotte 1 700.2273 328.4663 2.320401 457.0541 281.875
Marcotte 2 700.2276 328.4661 2.32039 457.0522 281.8764
Solodov-Tseng 700.1743 328.4948 2.321614 457.0557 281.8729
Table 4.6: Variances for route flow for N1 = 100, N2 = 100
4.2 Oligopolistic Market Equilibrium
We consider here the model in which m players are the producers of the
same commodity. The quantity produced by firm i is denoted by qi so that
q ∈ Rm denotes the global production vector. Let (Ω, P ) be a probability
space and for every i ∈ {1, . . .m, } consider functions fi : Ω × R → R and
p : Ω× Rm → R.
More precisely, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, (i.e. P-almost surely), fi(ω, qi)
represents the cost of producing the commodity by firm i, and is assumed
to be nonnegative, increasing, concave and C1, while p(ω, q1 + . . . + qm)
represents the demand price associated with the commodity. For almost
every ω ∈ Ω, p is assumed nonnegative, increasing, convex w.r.t. qi and C1.
We also assume that all these functions are random variables w.r.t. ω, i.e.
they are measurable with respect to the probability measure P on Ω. In this
way, we have introduced the possibility that both the production cost and the
demand price are affected by a certain degree of uncertainty, or randomness.
Thus, the welfare (or utility) function of player i is given by:
wi(ω, q1, . . . , qm) = p(ω, q1 + . . .+ qn)qi − fi(ω, qi). (4.10)
Although many authors assume no bounds on the production, in a more
realistic model the production capability is bounded from above and we allow
also for the upper bound being a random variable: 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω),
Thus, the specific Nash equilibrium problem associated with this model takes
42 4.2. Oligopolistic Market Equilibrium




−fi(ω, qi) + p(ω, qi +
∑
j 6=i
q∗j )qi, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (4.11)
In order to write the equivalent variational inequality, consider the closed
and convex subset of Rm:
K(ω) = {(q1, . . . , qm) : 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω), ∀i}













The Nash problem is then equivalent to the following variational inequality:




∗(ω)](qj − q∗j (ω)) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ K(ω). (4.13)
Since F (ω, ·) is continuous, and K(ω) is convex and compact, problem (4.13)
is solvable for almost every ω ∈ Ω, due to the Stampacchia’s theorem. More-
over, we assume that F (ω, ·) is monotone, i.e.:
m∑
i=1
(Fi(ω, q)− Fi(ω, q′))(qi − q′i) ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀q, q′ ∈ Rm.
F is said to be strictly monotone if the equality holds only for q = q′ and in
this case (4.13) has a unique solution. In the sequel the following uniform
strong monotonicity property will be useful:
∃α > 0 :
m∑
i=1
(Fi(ω, q)− Fi(ω, q′))(qi − q′i) ≥ α‖q − q′‖2 ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀q, q′ ∈ Rm.
(4.14)
Although the uniform strong monotonicity property is quite demanding,
nonetheless it is verified by some classes of utility functions frequently used
in the literature (see e.g. sect. 4.2.2).
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4.2.1 The Lebesgue space formulation
Since we are interested in computing statistical quantities associated with
the solution q∗(ω), in particular its mean value, we introduce a Lebesgue
space formulation of problems (4.11) and (4.13). In view of the numerical
approximation of the solution, we also assume that the random and the
deterministic part of the operator are separated. Thus, let:
wi(ω, q) = p(
m∑
j=1
qj) + β(ω)− α(ω)fi(qi)− gi(qi)
where α, β are real random variables, with 0 < α ≤ α(ω) ≤ α , and the
part of the cost which is affected by uncertainty is denoted now by fi. As a
consequence, the operator F takes the form:















The separation of variables allows us to use the approximation procedure
developed in [17]. Furthermore, we assume that F is uniformly strongly
monotone according to (4.14) and satisfies the following growth condition:
|Fi(ω, q)| ≤ c(1 + |q|),∀q ∈ Rm,∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i (4.15)
and wi(ω, 0) ∈ L1(Ω). Moreover, we shall assume that α ∈ L∞(Ω), while
β, qi ∈ L2(Ω). Under these assumptions the following Nash equilibrium prob-
lem can be derived (see [22] or [13] for a similar derivation which can be easily
extended to our functional setting):


















i+1, . . . , u
∗
m).
Then, we define a closed and convex set KP by
KP = {u ∈ L2(Ω, P,Rm) : 0 ≤ ui(ω) ≤ qi(ω), P − a.s.,∀i}
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∗(ω))(uj(ω)− u∗(ω)) ≥ 0,∀u ∈ KP . (4.17)
4.2.2 A class of utility functions
In this subsection, we consider a random version of a class of utility functions
widely used in the literature (see e.g. [34], chap. 6) and show that these
functions satisfy the theoretical requirements stated previously.
Thus, let
fi(ω, qi) = a(ω) aiq
2








where 0 < a ≤ a(ω) ≤ a, a ∈ L∞(Ω), e ∈ L2(Ω), and ai, bi, d, ci are positive
real numbers. Thus, wi(ω, q) = −[a(ω) aiq2i + biqi + ci] − d
∑m
i=1 qi + e(ω) ,
and
Fi(ω, q) = 2a(ω) aiqi+bi+d
m∑
i=1





For each ω the operator F consists of a linear part and a constant vector.
4.2.3 Numerical Results
As an examplem we take the random version of a classical oligopoly problem
presented in [34] where 3 producers are involved in the production of a ho-
mogeneous commodity. In the nonrandom version of the problem, the cost fi
of producing the commodity by firm i, and the demand function p are given




1 + q1 + 1
f2(q2) = 0.5q
2
2 + 4q2 + 2
f3(q3) = q
2










Solution of the above problem (q1, q2, q3) = (23/30, 0, 14/15) is given in [34].
We consider a random version of the above problem where the cost fi and
demand p are given by
f1(ω, q1) = a(ω)q
2
1 + q1 + 1
f2(ω, q2) = 0.5a(ω)q
2
2 + 4q2 + 2
f3(ω, q3) = a(ω)q
2











where a(ω) and e(ω) are random parameters that follow truncated normal
distributions:
a ∼ 0.5 ≤ N(1, 0.25) ≤ 1.5
e ∼ 4.5 ≤ N(5, 0.25) ≤ 5.5.
We use the approximation procedure described in Chapter 2 to evaluate
mean value of q. First, we choose a discretization of the parameter domain
[0.5, 1.5]× [4.5, 5.5] using N1×N2 points and solve the problem for each pair
(a(i), e(j)) using the extragradient methods described in Section 3. Then,
we evaluate the mean value of q by using appropriate probability distribu-
tion functions. Approximate mean values of q1, q2 and q3 are shown in the
Tables 4.9 and 4.11.
Variances are summarized in Table 4.12, and a comparison of the CPU times
is presented in Figure 4.2.
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Methods q1 q2 q3
Marcotte 0.75843 5.8345e− 08 0.92822
Marcotte1 0.75843 2.8107e− 08 0.92822
Marcotte2 0.75837 3.0205e− 08 0.92816
Solodov-Svaiter 0.75731 3.2252e− 08 0.92711
Solodov-Tseng 0.75808 −3.6382e− 05 0.92787
Table 4.7: Mean values of the production vector for N1 = 30, N2 = 30
Methods V ar(q1) V ar(q2) V ar(q3)
Marcotte 0.021754 3.3229e− 14 0.03428
Marcotte1 0.021754 7.9103e− 15 0.03428
Marcotte2 0.021751 9.5282e− 15 0.034276
Solodov-Svaiter 0.021764 1.9773e− 15 0.034297
Solodov-Tseng 0.021843 6.2711e− 10 0.034405
Table 4.8: Variances of the production vector for N1 = 30, N2 = 30
Methods q1 q2 q3
Marcotte 0.7648 5.5928e−08 0.93569
Marcotte 1 0.76479 2.8404e−08 0.93569
Marcotte 2 0.76473 2.8992e−08 0.93563
Solodov-Svaiter 0.76273 3.6563e−08 0.93363
Solodov-Tseng 0.76441 3.131e−05 0.93531
Table 4.9: Mean values of the production vector for N1 = 50, N2 = 50
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Methods V ar(q1) V ar(q2) V ar(q3)
Marcotte 0.01656 3.1049e− 14 0.026447
Marcotte1 0.01656 7.0627e− 15 0.026447
Marcotte2 0.016558 7.241e− 15 0.026445
Solodov-Svaiter 0.016546 1.2571e− 14 0.026435
Solodov-Tseng 0.016642 3.4075e− 10 0.026561
Table 4.10: Variances of the production vector for N1 = 50, N2 = 50
Methods q1 q2 q3
Marcotte 0.76935 5.8068e−08 0.94103
Marcotte 1 0.76935 2.7505e−08 0.94103
Marcotte 2 0.76928 2.9036e−08 0.94096
Solodov-Svaiter 0.76791 4.5022e−08 0.93959
Solodov-Tseng 0.76902 2.8959e−05 0.9407
Table 4.11: Mean values of the production vector for N1 = 100, N2 = 100
Methods V ar(q1) V ar(q2) V ar(q3)
Marcotte 0.012786 3.4821e−14 0.020762
Marcotte 1 0.012787 6.0461e−15 0.020762
Marcotte 2 0.012787 7.1256e−15 0.020763
Solodov-Svaiter 0.012769 4.0207e−15 0.020738
Solodov-Tseng 0.012869 3.7517e−09 0.020876
Table 4.12: Variances of the production vector for N1 = 100, N2 = 100
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of CPU times for the market equilibrium problem
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4.3 Environmental Games
In this section, we will introduce an application known as environmental
games. In the fundamental paper [3], Breton et al. formulated a two players
game to describe the joint implementation mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol,
while in [46], Tidbal and Zaccour compared various models of an environmen-
tal problem using a large class of revenue and damage cost functions. The
models proposed in [46] have been reformulated and extended in the paper
[22] by using the variational inequalities theory. We will discuss stochastic
noncooperative scenario where each player optimizes his/her welfare (defined
as the difference between the revenue resulting form the production and the
damage cost due to the corresponding pollution) under their individual en-
vironmental constraints. In this case, the players interact only through the
damage cost which is a function of the total polluting emission and this s-
cenario leads to a (stochastic) Nash equilibrium problem which, in turn, is
formulated as a stochastic variational inequality in Lebesgue space. We will
also describe the stochastic variational inequality that describes the coopera-
tive scenario where the players agree to optimize the sum of their individual
welfares under a joint environmental constraint. Next, we discuss the so-
called umbrella scenario where the players act in a selfish manner but under
a common environmental constraint; this scenario leads to a (stochastic)
generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP).
4.3.1 The stochastic noncooperative scenario
In this scenario, each player is a subject who produces, pollutes, and aims
to maximize his/her welfare function under some environmental constraints.
The welfare function is defined as the difference between the revenue resulting
from the production and the damage cost due to pollution. In the model we
consider the welfare function is not deterministic but can be affected by some
random variables. We assume that pollution is proportional to the industrial
output so that the revenue of player i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, can be expressed as a
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function of its polluting emission ei. Let (Ω, P ) be a probability space and
for every i ∈ {1 . . . n} consider functions fi : Ω×R→ R and di : Ω×Rn → R.
More precisely, for almost every ω ∈ Ω, (i.e. P-almost surely ) fi(ω, ei) rep-
resents the revenue function of player i, which is assumed to be nonnegative,
increasing, concave and C1 while the cost of the environmental damage de-
pends on the total emission and is denoted by di(ω, e1 + . . .+en). For almost
every ω ∈ Ω, di are assumed to be nonnegative, increasing, convex w.r.t. ei
and C1. We assume also that all these functions are random variables w.r.t.
ω, i.e. they are measurable with respect to the probability measure P on Ω.
Thus, the welfare function of player i is given by:
wi(ω, e1, . . . , en) = fi(ω, ei)− di(ω, e1 + . . .+ en). (4.19)
In the noncooperative scenario, each player has to satisfy the random en-
vironmental constraint: 0 ≤ ei ≤ ei(ω), while maximizing his/her welfare
for every action of the other players. This situation naturally leads to the
following Nash equilibrium problem:
For a.e. ω ∈ Ω, find eN(ω) =
(








fi(ω, ei)− di(ω, ei +
∑
j 6=i
eNj ), ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (4.20)
This problem is equivalent to a variational inequality. Thus, for each ω
consider the closed and convex subset of Rn: KN(ω) = {(e1, . . . , en) : 0 ≤
ei ≤ ei(ω), ∀i} and define the functions












The Nash problem is then equivalent to the following variational inequality:




N(ω)](ej − eNj (ω)) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ KN(ω). (4.22)
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Since F (ω, ·) is continuous, and KN(ω) is convex and compact, problem
(4.22) is solvable, for almost every ω ∈ Ω. Moreover we assume that F (ω, ·)
is monotone, i.e.:
∑n
i=1(Fi(ω, e)−Fi(ω, e′))(ei− e′i) ≥ 0 ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀e, e′ ∈ Rn.
F is said to be strictly monotone if the equality holds only for e = e′ and
in this case (4.22) has a unique solution. We mention here following useful
uniform strong monotonicity property:
∃α > 0 :
n∑
i=1
(Fi(ω, e)− Fi(ω, e′))(ei − e′i) ≥ α‖e− e′‖2 ∀ω ∈ Ω,∀e, e′ ∈ Rn.
(4.23)
As it was the case for earlier problems, we assume that the random and the
deterministic part of the operator can be separated: wi(ω, e) = ai(ω)f(ei)−
bi(ω)di(e1 + . . . en), where ai, bi are real valued random variables such that
0 < Ai ≤ ai(ω) ≤ Ai, 0 < Bi ≤ bi(ω) ≤ Bi. The separation of variables now
allows us to use the approximation procedure developed in [17]. We are inter-
ested in computing statistical quantities associated with the solution eN(ω),
in particular its mean value. For this purpose, we introduce a Lebesgue space
formulation of problems (4.20) and (4.22). We assume that F is uniformly
strongly monotone according to (4.23) and satisfies the following condition:
|Fi(ω, e)| ≤ c(1 + |e|),∀e ∈ Rn,∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀i (4.24)
and that wi(ω, 0) ∈ L1(Ω). Moreover, we shall assume that ai, bi ∈ L∞(Ω),
while ei ∈ L2(Ω). Under these assumptions the following Nash equilibrium
problem can be derived (see [22] for a similar derivation which can be easily
extended to this functional setting):


















i+1, . . . , u
N
n ).
Then, we define the closed and convex set: KNP = {u ∈ L2(Ω, P,Rn) : 0 ≤
ui(ω) ≤ ei(ω), P − a.s.,∀i} and consider the variational inequality formula-
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N(ω))(uj(ω)− uN(ω)) ≥ 0,∀u ∈ KNP . (4.26)
Random noncooperative scenario will be studied through (4.26)
4.3.2 The stochastic cooperative scenario
In the cooperative scenario, all players agree to optimize the sum of their
individual welfares under a joint environmental constraint. Thus, for each





ai(ω)f(ei)− bi(ω)di(e1 + . . .+ en) (4.27)




i=1 ei(ω) = e(ω)}.
Under the strict convexity hypothesis, the problem has a unique solution
eC(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. Moreover, (4.27) is equivalent to the variational in-
equality associated to the convex set KC and to the operator FC : Ω×Rn →
Rn defined by






i bi(ω)di(e1 + . . .+ en)
∂ei
.





C(ω)](ej − eCj (ω)) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ KC(ω).
Analogously to the previous case, we can define the closed and convex set
KCP by




i=1 ei(ω) = e(ω), P−a.s.}
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C(ω))(vj(ω)− uCj (ω)) ≥ 0,∀v ∈ KCP . (4.29)
4.3.3 The stochastic umbrella scenario
In the umbrella scenario, each player acts in a selfish manner and aims to
optimize his/her individual welfare, for every choice of the rival’s strategies.
However, all the players agree to satisfy a common environmental constraint.
Hence, in this model we are looking for a generalized Nash equilibrium, i.e.
for a vector eR(ω) =
(











eRj ), ∀ω ∈ Ω (4.30)
subject to ei +
∑
j 6=i
eRj ≤ e(ω), ei(ω) ≥ 0, for all i, where we are using the su-
perscript R to recall that equilibria of this kind were introduced for the first
time by Rosen [39]. Let us note that a generalized Nash equilibrium problem
(GNEP) has in general infinite solutions and it is equivalent to a quasivari-
ational inequality as pointed out by Harker in a finite-dimensional setting
[21]. However, as already noted by Rosen, among all possible solutions of
a GNEP it is possible to select some equilibria with interesting properties.
Quite recently, Facchinei et al. [12] reformulated the result of Rosen in the
framework of variational inequalities (see also [33]). More precisely, they
proved that one can associate a GNEP with common constraints to a vari-
ational inequality whose solutions also solve the original GNEP. Moreover,
the solutions found in this way have the special property that all the players
share a common vector of Lagrange multipliers. These solutions are consid-
ered to be ”socially stable” due to the economic meaning usually given to
Lagrange multipliers. We note that the result in [12] has been extended very
recently to infinite dimensional spaces (see [13]).
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Thus, we associate the following variational inequality to problem (4.30): For




R(ω)](ei − eRi (ω)) ≥ 0, ∀e ∈ KR(ω), (4.31)
where KR(ω) = KC(ω). We can derive the Lebesgue formulation of the















j (ω) ≤ e(ω). The Lebesgue formulation
of (4.31) is:





R(ω)](uj(ω)− uRj (ω))dPω ≥ 0, ∀u ∈ KRP , (4.33)




In this section, we illustrate the three stochastic models through a two-player
example. We consider a simple case of a two-player game where welfare
functions are given by




Consider two random parameters A1 and A2 which follow uniform and trun-
cated normal distributions, respectively,
A1 ∼ U(0.6, 2)
A2 ∼ 2 ≤ N(3, 0.25) ≤ 4
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in all three scenarios. The following parameters are held fixed: E1 = 5.5,
E2 = 3, B1 = 1/30, B2 = 1/30. We choose a discretization of the interval
[0.6, 2] with N1 points and a discretization of the interval [2, 4] with N2 points
and solve the problem for each pair (A1(i), A2(j)) using extragradient meth-
ods introduced in Chapter 3. Comparisons of approximate mean values of
the variables u1 and u2 are shown in the tables below. Table 4.17 shows the
results for the noncooperative scenario, and tables 4.23 and 4.29 show the
results for cooperative and umbrella scenarios respectively. A comparison of
the CPU times is shown in Figure 4.3 (similar behavior is observed during








Table 4.13: Noncooperative scenario: Mean values of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =
30, N2 = 30







Table 4.14: Noncooperative scenario: Variances of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =
30, N2 = 30








Table 4.15: Noncooperative scenario: Mean values of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =
50, N2 = 50







Table 4.16: Noncooperative scenario: Variances of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =





Marcotte 1 5.9913 4.2522
Marcotte 2 5.9908 4.2522
Solodov-Tseng 5.9897 4.2522
Table 4.17: Noncooperative scenario: Mean values of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =
100, N2 = 100
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Table 4.18: Noncooperative scenario: Variances of uN1 and u
N
2 for N1 =









Table 4.19: Cooperative scenario: Mean values of uC1 and u
C
2 for N1 =
30, N2 = 30








Table 4.20: Cooperative scenario: Variances of uC1 and u
C
2 for N1 = 30, N2 =
30









Table 4.21: Cooperative scenario: Mean values of uC1 and u
C
2 for N1 =
50, N2 = 50








Table 4.22: Cooperative scenario: Variances of uC1 and u
C






Marcotte 1 2.4516 7.5638
Marcotte 2 2.4517 7.5636
Solodov-Svaiter 2.5037 7.419
Solodov-Tseng 2.4419 7.4749
Table 4.23: Cooperative scenario: Mean values of uC1 and u
C
2 for N1 =
100, N2 = 100
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Table 4.24: Cooperative scenario: Variances of uC1 and u
C










Table 4.25: Umbrella scenario: Mean values of uU1 and u
U
2 for N1 = 30, N2 =
30








Table 4.26: Umbrella scenario: Variances of uU1 and u
U
2 for N1 = 30, N2 = 30









Table 4.27: Umbrella scenario: Mean values of uU1 and u
U
2 for N1 = 50, N2 =
50








Table 4.28: Umbrella scenario: Variances of uU1 and u
U





Marcotte 1 3.0415 9.0036
Marcotte 2 3.0416 9.0035
Solodov-Tseng 3.0420 9.0037
Table 4.29: Umbrella scenario: Mean values of uU1 and u
U
2 for N1 = 100, N2 =
100
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Table 4.30: Umbrella scenario: Variances of uU1 and u
U
2 for N1 = 100, N2 =
100
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of CPU times for the environmental game (umbrella
scenario)
4.4 Stochastic Nonlinear Oligopoly Model
In this section, we introduce a model of oligopolistic market with uncertain
data and show that the theoretical and numerical tools can be successfully
applied to the model. The classical oligopolistic market equilibrium problem
is a Nash game with a special structure and it was first introduced by A.
Cournot a long time ago. Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in
oligopoly theory, and many specific cases of oligopolistic markets have been
studied in detail, for instance the electricity market (see, e.g., [7, 8]).
We consider here the case in which m players are the producers of the same
commodity. The quantity produced by firm i is denoted by qi so that q ∈
Rm denotes the global production vector. Let (Ω,A, P ) be a probability
space and for every i ∈ {1, . . .m} consider functions fi : Ω × R → R and
p : Ω × Rm → R. More precisely, fi(ω, qi) represents the cost of producing
the commodity for firm i, and is assumed to be, P − a.s., nonnegative,
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increasing and C1, while p(ω, q1 + . . . + qm) represents the demand price
associated with the commodity. For P−almost every ω ∈ Ω, p is assumed
nonnegative, increasing and C1. The resulting welfare function wi is assumed
to be concave with respect to qi. We also assume that all these functions are
random variables w.r.t. ω, i.e. they are measurable with respect to the
probability measure P on Ω. In this way, we cover the possibility that both
the production cost and the demand price are affected by a certain degree of
uncertainty, or randomness. Thus, the welfare (or utility) function of player
i, representing the net revenue, is given by:
wi(ω, q1, . . . , qm) = p(ω, q1 + . . .+ qm)qi − fi(ω, qi). (4.34)
Although many models assume no bounds on the production, in a more
realistic model the production capability is bounded from above and we also
allow these upper bounds to be random variables: 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω). Thus,
the specific Nash equilibrium problem associated with this model takes the
following form:







q∗j (ω) )qi, −fi(ω, qi)}, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(4.35)
In order to write the equivalent variational inequality, consider,∀ω, a closed
and convex subset of Rm:
K(ω) = {(q1, . . . , qm) : 0 ≤ qi ≤ qi(ω), ∀i}
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The Nash problem is then equivalent to the following variational inequality:




















(qi− q∗i (ω)) ≥ 0
(4.37)
∀q ∈ K(ω).
Now we are interested in computing statistical quantities associated with
the solution q∗(ω), in particular its mean value. For this purpose, in accor-
dance with the general scheme, we consider a Lebesgue space formulation of






















(ui(ω)− u∗i (ω) )dPω ≥ 0 , (4.38)
where
K = {u ∈ Lp(Ω, P,Rm) : 0 ≤ ui(ω) ≤ qi(ω)}, qi ∈ Lp(ω, P ).
Since the stochastic oligopolistic market problem will be studied through
(4.38).
4.4.1 Numerical Results
In this subsection, we consider a modified and random version of a class
of utility functions introduced by Murphy, Sheraly and Soyster in [32] and
successively used by other scholars. These functions generate a nonlinear
monotone variational inequality on a certain Lp space, where p is determined
by the power law of the cost functions. The cost and demand price functions
for the five-firm case in [32] are given by:








i , i = 1, . . . , 5
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The values of the parameters ci, ki, bi in [32] alongwith our upper bounds for
the qi are given Table 4.31.
An approximate solution of the problem obtained by a projection method
is given in [34] as (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5) = (36.937, 41.817, 43.706, 42.659, 39.179).
Before introducing random parameters in the above functions, we note that
Table 4.31: Parameter values for the nonlinear problem
i 1 2 3 4 5
ci 10 8 6 4 2
ki 5 5 5 5 5
bi 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
qi 100 100 100 100 100
the demand price becomes unbounded when the total quantity Q approaches
0 (commodity is scarce). Although the solution Q∗ = 0 is never met in
most examples, in order to deal with a well behaved function we consider the
functional form:
p(Q) = 50001/1.1(Q+ e)−1/1.1,
where e is a small positive parameter which determines the maximum price
the consumer can pay when the commodity is very scarce. We add a random
perturbation r(ω) to ci in the model, and also modulate the price function
by a random function S(ω).
Thus, for the general case of m firms, we introduce cost functions given by:














where 0 < s < S(ω) < s, and a is a parameter such that 0 < a < 1 (
a = 1/1.1 in [32]).
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With these functions we can build the Carathéodory function F which defines
the variational inequality through:











i = 1 . . .m.
We also use the notation Fi(ω, q) = Gi(ω, q) +Hi(ω, q), where Gi represents
the sum of the first three terms in (4.41), while Hi is the rest of the sum,
which contains the price function.
Now, let us consider the case m = 5 with the data as in Table 4.31. The
function F , defines a Nemitsky operator between Lebesgue spaces, as ex-
plained in the previous sections. To be precise, since the exponents bi in
the cost functions vary from 0.8 to 1.2, we select p = 1 + 1/0.8 so that the
Nemitsky operator associated to F maps functions u ∈ L9/4 into u ∈ L9/5.
Moreover, we let random parameters r(ω) and S(ω) to have truncated normal
distributions as follows:
r ∼ −0.5 ≤ N(0, 0.25) ≤ 0.5
s ∼ 4950 ≤ N(5000, 10) ≤ 5050
while fixing parameter e at 0.0001. Mean valuesE(u) of u(r, s) = (u1, u2, u3, u4, u5)
obtained by numerical approximations are presented in Table ?? where nr
and ns stand for number of discretization points for intervals [−0.5, 0.5] and
[4950, 5050] respectively. Comparisons of variances are shown in Tables below
and CPU times are shown in Figure 4.4.
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Methods u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
Marcotte 35.3355 40.0073 41.8117 40.8079 37.4774
Marcotte1 35.3356 40.0073 41.8116 40.8079 37.4774
Marcotte2 35.3355 40.0073 41.8116 40.8078 37.4773
Solodov 35.3356 40.0074 41.8117 40.8079 37.4775
Solodov-Tseng 35.3284 40.0028 41.81 40.8083 37.4788
Table 4.32: Mean values of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 30, ns = 30
Methods V ar(u1) V ar(u2) V ar(u3) V ar(u4) V ar(u5)
Marcotte 57.2018 73.1324 79.7252 75.8389 63.9054
Marcotte1 57.2019 73.1324 79.7251 75.8388 63.9052
Marcotte2 57.2018 73.1323 79.725 75.8386 63.9048
Solodov-Svaiter 57.2021 73.1327 79.7254 75.839 63.9055
Solodov-Tseng 57.1786 73.1159 79.7188 75.8404 63.9101
Table 4.33: Variances of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 30, ns = 30
Methods u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
Marcotte 35.9807 40.7377 42, 5752 41.5533 38.1622
Marcotte1 35.9807 40.7377 42, 5751 41.5533 38.1621
Marcotte2 35.9807 40.7377 42, 5751 41.5532 38.162
Solodov-Svaiter 35.9808 40.7378 42, 5752 41.5533 38.1622
Solodov-Tseng 35.9749 40.7379 42, 5736 41.5534 38.1632
Table 4.34: Mean values of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 50, ns = 50
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Methods V ar(u1) V ar(u2) V ar(u3) V ar(u4) V ar(u5)
Marcotte 34.9946 44.6658 48.6341 46.2236 38.9276
Marcotte1 34.9947 44.6659 48.6341 46.2236 38.9275
Marcotte2 34.9947 44.6658 48.634 46.2234 38.9273
Solodov-Svaiter 34.9948 44.666 48.6342 46.2237 38.9277
Solodov-Tseng 34.9831 44.6574 48.6304 46.2239 38.9296
Table 4.35: Variances of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 50, ns = 50
Methods u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
Marcotte 36.4616 41.2822 43.1442 42.1088 38.6725
Marcotte 1 36.4617 41.2822 43.1442 42.1088 38.6725
Marcotte 2 36.4616 41.2821 43.1442 42.1088 38.6724
Solodov-Svaiter 36.4529 41.2755 43.1398 42.1059 38.6697
Solodov-Tseng 36.4566 41.2788 43.1426 42.1086 38.6731
Table 4.36: Mean values of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 100, ns = 100
Methods V ar(u1) V ar(u2) V ar(u3) V ar(u4) V ar(u5)
Marcotte 17.9041 22.7581 24.7062 23.4311 19.7038
Marcotte 1 17.9041 22.7581 24.7061 23.4311 19.7037
Marcotte 2 17.904 22.758 24.7009 23.4278 19.7009
Solodov-Tseng 17.8989 22.7542 24.7042 23.4308 19.7044
Table 4.37: Variances of ui, i = 1, . . . , 5 for nr = 100, ns = 100
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of CPU times for the nonlinear problem
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tures on stochastic programming, volume 9 of MPS/SIAM Series on
Optimization. Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM),
Philadelphia, PA; Mathematical Programming Society (MPS), Philadel-
phia, PA, 2009. Modeling and theory.
[42] Alexander Shapiro and Huifu Xu. Stochastic mathematical programs
with equilibrium constraints, modelling and sample average approxima-
tion. Optimization, 57(3):395–418, 2008.
75 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[43] M. J. Smith. The existence, uniqueness and stability of traffic equilibria.
Transportation Res. Part B, 13(4):295–304, 1979.
[44] M. V. Solodov and B. F. Svaiter. A new projection method for vari-
ational inequality problems. SIAM J. Control Optim., 37(3):765–776,
1999.
[45] M. V. Solodov and P. Tseng. Modified projection-type methods for
monotone variational inequalities. SIAM J. Control Optim., 34(5):1814–
1830, 1996.
[46] Mabel Tidbal and Georges Zaccour. An environmental game with cou-
pling constraints. Environmental Modeling and Assesment, pages 153–
158, 2005.
[47] F. Tinti. Numerical solution for pseudomonotone variational inequality
problems by extragradient methods. In Variational analysis and applica-
tions, volume 79 of Nonconvex Optim. Appl., pages 1101–1128. Springer,
New York, 2005.
[48] A. V. Zykina and N. V. Melenchuk. A two-step extragradient method
for variational inequalities. Izv. Vyssh. Uchebn. Zaved. Mat., (9):82–85,
2010.
[49] A. V. Zykina and N. V. Melenchuk. Finite number of iterations in
the two-step extragradient method. Izv. Vyssh. Uchebn. Zaved. Mat.,
(9):75–79, 2014.
